Twitter Beğeni Hilesi

Honored to have written a chapter about #Iran-#Taliban relations for a new book published by Centre for Afghanistan Middle East & Africa -CAMEA and edited by Amina Khan.

This is a significant shift. So far, #Iran‘s official line was to emphasize mutual return to the original JCPOA. Still unclear whether, by mentioning Ukraine & Gaza wars, Araqchi is suggesting a more for more or less for less approach - my guess is the latter though ⬇️

Araghchi’s comments about Russia and China echo Pezeshkian’s op-ed in Tehran Times: - the importance of the 25 year comprehensive agreement with China and the anticipated 20 year agreement with Russia for long-term ties - Russia and China stood by Iran during difficult times

It's out! Oxford Academic: The Economy of Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century Happy to contribute a chapter w/Larry Fallin on the re-imagining of the Kingdom through Entertainment & Tourism: - sociopolitical change - the new giga projects - the new tourism admin - promise & perils

The spread of misinformation & disinformation continues to be used as a weapon in the war in #Gaza. As part of its campaign to undermine & discredit UNRWA, the Government of Israel has been buying ads on Google to block users from giving donations to the Agency + undertake a

On systemic defamation campaigns!

Within year of taking office, Raisi got rid of the JCPOA negotiators. Seyed Abbas Araghchi went to Khamenei's advisory FP council, Javad Zarif returned to academia & Ravanchi was recalled from UN mission. Return of "JCPOA trio" carries clear msg. Is the west listening? amwaj.media/media-monitor/…

Very good threat on Arab strategy toward Isreal, its limits, possible shifts, and reasons it failed to stop the war.

Iran’s new Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with key military officials in Tehran. These meetings are part of civil-military coordination, playing an important role in internal dialogues and shaping the policy directions of MFA.

Especially considering Pezeshkian's clear attempt to maintain good relations with the security establishment and minimize internal friction between his government (particularly the MFA) and the IRGC (میدان vs. دیپلماسی).

For the first time since the start of the war in #Ukraine, #Iran is seeing the direct negative repercussions of the war for its core national & geopolitical interests. It’s a clear indication of the limits of RU-IR “strategic partnership“

Read this book if you have not yet done so. It features excellent papers on how institutions in Iran operate.

خلاصه اینکه در اظهارنظر درباره مساله کریدور زنگزور باید احتیاط کرد.

🇸🇦Latest for Al-Monitor: #SaudiArabia initiated a major overhaul of its top military leadership, replacing the heads of its joint, land, and naval forces. This marks the third significant reshuffle under MBS and signals a potential turning point in the kingdom’s defense strategy.

Saudi Deputy Defence Minister and Deputy Commander in Chief of Artesh met in Beijing. Both sides emphasised on the need for greater security coordination and expanding military cooperation. If happens, this is what moves Saudi-Iranian normalisation to the next level.

Just compare to where we were a couple of years ago. Yes, it’s slow, but the meetings, face-time and discussions are already a success for the #Iran-#Saudi deal - as long as they have enough momentum to keep frustrations in check

حتما به سخنان کوتاه و منطقی مرحوم زرین کوب در مورد فرهنگ ایرانی-اسلامی ایران به دقت گوش دهید .

My latest for Amwaj.media on #Iran's alleged transfer of ballistic missiles to #Russia & Tehran‘s potential motives in enhancing military cooperation with Moscow 👇 amwaj.media/article/will-m…

If true, this is a major shift in Russian policy and explains why Tehran agreed to deliver missiles.

Today, Putin increased the military’s size for the 3rd time since 2022. Can they sustain 1.5M postwar, at a time when the budget will be under pressure to procure equipment? Not without tradeoffs. See my new report for more on this and other tradeoffs👇 carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/…