Torgin (not your keys not your coins)
@MTorgin
Auditor at @chain_security.
Opinions are my own.
ID:1362177237961834496
17-02-2021 23:09:11
4,9K Tweets
2,3K Followers
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The recording of my talk on Oracle-free DeFi at EthereumZuri.ch is out now!
I highlight the fundamental problems with using Oracles and use Frankencoin and Ajna as examples on how we could have lending without them.
youtu.be/lTvsS9b0l2o?si…
The very FIRST words
of Satoshi's white paper:
'Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer...'
Natalie Smolenski delivers a simple yet profound talk on the importance of these 5 words at The Bitcoin Policy Summit in DC (@btcpolicyorg) 🔥
Meet matthiasegli.eth next weekend in Amsterdam for:
🎤 a presentation on deployment validation and what measures can be implemented to avoid exploits such as Munchables
🔒 a panel on security with Immunefi , Trail of Bits , and Hats.Finance 🦇🔊 | We’re at #Token2049!
🧑🏼⚖️ the hackathon, where he’s a judge
Today at EthereumZuri.ch, Pietro Carta presented our findings related to EIP-1153 (Transient Storage)
. EthereumZuri.ch (@MTorgin) 's Twitter Profile">Torgin EthereumZuri.ch: «Centralized oracles suck! We can avoid them, but there are tradeoffs »
Talking about Oracle-free DeFi at EthereumZuri.ch , giving the examples of Ajna and Frankencoin
Oisín Kyne | Obol Network Imo the staked value is already so high that it's not reasonable to assume an attacker would buy coins to attack Ethereum.
The only realistic scenarios are those where entities that already have a large stake are compelled to attack/censor (e.g. through seizure or regulation).
arixon.eth 🦇🔊 Centralized sequencer rollup will always be cheaper than a based sequencer rollup.
So I think the ideal stack is based sequencer L2 with centralized sequencer L3.
If the L3 sequencer fails you can force-exit on the L2 at reasonable price.
L1 force-exits are expensive.
Great Ethena Labs Risk overview by monetsupply.eth
Highly recommend if you're interested in this stuff
forum.makerdao.com/t/risk-assessm…