🚨 Job alert: Tenure-line assistant professor in China and International Security Georgetown SFS. Teaching on Chinese military and U.S.-China relations. Applications due October 17, 2022 👇

Looking forward to seeing you tomorrow!

30% discount available on PUP's website: press.princeton.edu/books/paperbac… 12/n

If 2,000 years of Chinese history tells us something, it is that the country often suffers from a ruler who refuses to leave. 11/n

In the early 20th century, imperial China fell. It fell not because of the Western intrusion nor because of internal rebellions. It collapsed because the emperors’ relentless pursuit of power and survival through fragmenting the elites crippled the Chinese state. 10/n

The Chinese elites started as a star network. After a mass rebellion physically destroyed the medieval elites in the 9th century, Chinese emperors were able to reshape elite social relations into a bowtie network. 9/n

A bowtie network, while conducive to ruler survival, undermines the elites' capacity to build a strong state because they can't trust each other for collective action. Their local interests also weaken their incentive to strengthen the central state. 8/n

However, a star network threatens the survival of the ruler. Instead, the ruler can shape the structure of the elites (when opportunity arises) into a bowtie network. Here, the elites are disconnected with each other. They are also regionally based. 7/n

To have a strong state, the ruler needs a coherent elite who can commit to the common goal of state building. I characterize the structure of such an elite as a star network in which central elites are connected with each other via social ties (e.g., intermarriages): 6/n

My overarching argument is that Chinese rulers faced a fundamental tradeoff that I call the sovereign's dilemma: a coherent elite that could take collective actions to strengthen the state was also capable of revolting against the ruler. 5/n

The central puzzle that motivates this book is why short-lived emperors often ruled a strong state while long-lasting emperors governed a weak one. 4/n

As emperors' tenures lengthened, however, the Chinese state gradually declined. Take fiscal strength as an example. In the early Song era, the Chinese government taxed over 15% of its economy. This percentage dropped to almost 1% during the Qing Dynasty. 3/n

During 2,000 years of imperial rule, Chinese emperors were becoming increasingly insecure—before they became extremely secure. Their probability of being deposed by elites peaked in the 10th century and gradually declined afterwards. 2/n

Our co-organizers, Xiaobo Lü | 吕晓波 and Yuhua Wang, are quoted in this Financial Times article, discussing how reduced access to China has impacted Chinese politics research.

Next CPRP presentation by Lucie Lu (UIUC) will be on September 30 (Friday) at 1-2 PM EST. Jennifer Pan (Stanford) and Erik Peterson (Rice) will be discussants. Paper and Zoom link here: chinesepoliticsresearchinprogress.com/schedule/

Northwestern PoliSci is hiring: TT Assistant Professor position in the internal and/or external politics of China. Pls spread the word. Victor Shih Yuhua Wang

More details here: polisci.northwestern.edu/about/faculty-…

👋 It’s me! I’m on the job market!

Looking for someone who knows about the mechanics of authoritarianism? Who thinks about bureaucrats and accountability? Who knows about Chinese politics past and present?

Maybe I’m your guy!

Check out my website! mthompsonbrusstar.com

A thread about my new book The Performative State Cornell Press. I’ve published the main argument earlier in a World Politics article called “Performative Governance” tiny.cc/PG20. The book, I hope, offers much more than that. 1/9