V different issue, of course, but one still remembers efforts by the Obama admin to convince key US allies to stay out of the CN-led AIIB -- that effort failed miserably, in part b/c Europe and Asia wanted to maintain their access to the lucrative CN market. (3)

One of the key questions raised in the piece is whether key US allies -- including ROK, Japan, Israel, and the UK -- will go along with the US move to techno-isolate CN. If I read EW and AS right, the jury is still out on that issue. (2)

Fantastic piece by Edward Wong and Ana Swanson on the geopolitics surrounding the Biden admin's move to cut CN off from key US tech and tech expertise -- a must-read!
nytimes.com/2022/10/13/us/…

All in all, an insightful, must-read piece -- congrats to 蔡霞 and Foreign Affairs for publishing it!

But such moves are the exception that proves the rule. I worry that CX's suggestion that (eg) LKQ might take action against Xi overstates the degree of acute friction between them. LKQ is more pro-market, sure, but such is a far cry from active resistance to Xi's 3rd term. (14)

For sure, there are some who might be brave enough to express their criticisms publicly. Nikkei Asia recently published this story about a short video from 105yr old cadre Song Ping, who implicitly criticized Xi's approach to economic governance. (13)
asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks…

Lastly, I am skeptical that there is much in the way of active opposition to Xi inside the CCP right now. CX is right that many CCP leaders indulge in (v careful) private grumbling about Xi's policy choices and leadership style. But active resistance? I just don't see it. (12)

In fact, those of us who have written on CN constitutionalism predicted that the constitutional norms limiting Xi from taking a 3rd term as head of state simply would not hold. See my 2017 piece on this topic for Foreign Policy here (11):
foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/07/xi-…

End result was much less of a commitment to collective leadership and term limits than CX suggests. As Xi's tenure shows, the norms that were in place -- including relevant state constitutional provisions -- were not so hard to smash, after all. (10)

For sure, Deng was aware of the excesses of the Mao era, and wanted to implement reforms that would guard against the emergence of a 2nd Mao. But Deng and others also wanted to increase their own power, often at the cost of building institutions/norms that would bind themselves.

Take Jiang Zemin's consultation with other members of the PBSC, eg -- might not such moves be explained by his relatively weak hand when he was catapulted to power in the aftermath of the 1989 TAM SQ crackdown? Same for Hu Jintao, laboring for years in Jiang's shadow. (8)